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THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IN THE PROFESSIONAL
LICENSING PROCESS IN PENNSYLVANIA
BY MORRIS J. DEAN*
A significant area of state administrative action involves the licensure of
members of various occupations and professions. The acknowledged purpose
of a licensing law is to limit access to an occupation. Such a restraint on
personal choice can only be justified by the social and police power considerations of assuring the public of qualified professional practitioners.1 However, broad discretion in administering the restraints of the licensing laws has
been conferred upon licensing boards. Obviously, the screening function of
licensure would be threatened if such an administrative body could abuse that
discretion by granting, denying or revoking access to an occupation on
grounds other than technical or moral qualification. 2 Do adequate safeguards
exist in the licensing process to prevent the possibility of such abuse of administrative discretion? This is the problem to which this Article is addressed.
The problem requires a preliminary determination of the adequacy of the
several standards used by the courts to assess the proper exercise of agency
discretion. The judicial requirement of mere "substantial" evidence to support
administrative findings would appear to afford inadequate protection to many
individuals whose movement in or out of a profession is adversely affected
by a board decision. The standard for judicial review of agency action gives
such weight to a board's findings that it is beyond a court's scope of review
to determine whether, under the same facts, it would have reached a different
decision. It may only consider whether, under such facts, the decision rendered by the agency could be reached. 3 Consequently, compliance by a licensing board with the standard developed for judicial review is no assurance
* A.B., 1951, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1954, Yale University; Deputy
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the professional licensing
boards and the Pennsylvania Department of Commerce; member, Philadelphia Bar. The
opinions expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and are not to be
construed as an official statement of policy on behalf of the Commonwealth.
1. See Byse, Opportunity To Be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 57

(1952).
2. Professional licensing boards are able to exert control by (1) regulating the
inflow of members into the profession or occupation by prescribing and enforcing entrance
requirements and (2) by eliminating undesirable or incompetent members by license

revocation. For a detailed analysis of these processes, see ibid.

3. Arbitrary decision making is controlled to some extent by the "substantial evidence
rule." See, e.g., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Fortier, 395 Pa. 247, 150 A.2d
122 (1959), Pennsylvania State Bd. of Medical Education & Licensure v. Schireson,
360 Pa. 129, 61 A.2d 343 (1948); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Kauffman Department Stores, Inc., 345 Pa. 398, 29 A.2d 90 (1942). On the other hand, "questions of
policy are not submitted to judicial determination, and the courts have no general authority of supervision over the exercise of discretion which under our system is reposed in
the people or other departments of government." Hayes v. Scranton, 354 Pa. 477, 482,
47 A.2d 798, 801 (1946).
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that any decision it may reach is based on a fair appraisal of the facts, but
only that it is supported by evidence which appears of record.
The due process test for fair administrative procedure is also inadequate
as a safeguard against certain unauthorized licensing board activity. This
test is satisfied, under the court decisions, if at some point in the administrative process, the person adversely affected by an administrative decision has
4
been accorded a formal hearing and certain other procedural formalities.
The Administrative Agency Law incorporates this principle by requiring
such procedures only at the point of "final" decision. 5
But, a formal hearing at the end of the administrative process is no
warrant of a fair hearing. Fairness requires affording an individual an opportunity not merely to make a record for appeal but also to persuade the
board of the merit of his position. Obviously, the formal hearing contemplated by the Administrative Agency Law comes too late in the proceedings
to assure such an opportunity to persuade, since most of the decisive determinations are made early in the administrative process-when the person
affected may not even be present or represented.
The judicial standard for fair agency procedure is totally inoperative in
the situation where the grant of a license rather than its denial or revocation
may be improper. In such case, not even the limited protection of a formal
hearing is available. The recipient of the license is hardly likely to demand
such a hearing to air his good fortune, and likely protestants, such as professional associations, are barred from challenging the grant of licensure either
before the board or the courts by restrictive "standing" doctrines.,
4. This principle was recently enunciated by the Commonwealth Court in Kilmer
Bros. v. Batt, 73 Dauphin 176 (Pa. C.P. 1958). It is based on the rule originally announced
in Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941), where the Supreme
Court said: "The demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the initial stage
or at any particular point or at more than one point in an administrative proceeding
so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective." Both
cases involved administrative proceedings under fair labor standards laws authorizing
industry committees to revise their minimum wages subject to the approval of an administrator. In both cases, the courts, when confronted by the argument that the committee had unconstitutionally failed to allow an opportunity for a hearing, rejected the
contention on the ground that the proceedings before the administrator satisfied the
requirements of due process. In short, although the framing of a wage order is a twopart proceeding involving two different decision-making bodies, the minimum wage cases
held that only the final action requires a hearing. Consequently, the same principle applies
with even greater force to the licensing field where all action with respect to a licensee
or applicant is taken by the same licensing board.
5. These safeguards include an opportunity for hearing at which the interested
parties may introduce evidence, meet evidence offered by others, and make arguments
to the deciding authority. The Administrative Agency Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§§ 1710.31-33 (1962). This law requires such procedural safeguards to be observed by
an agency in connection with any "adjudication" it issues. An adjudication is defined
in the law as a final order, decree or decision of an agency. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 1710.2(a) (1962).
6. Keystone Racing Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm'n, 405 Pa. 1, 173 A.2d

1962]

PROFESSIONAL LICENSING PROCESS

In the face of the limited assurance of administrative fairness provided
by judicial safeguards, the licensing process itself must be examined to
determine (1) the need for affording interested parties an opportunity to
persuade, (2) the adequacy of present administrative safeguards for that
purpose, and (3) remedial proposals.
THE NEED FOR A FAIR HEARING

The typical licensing statute confers upon a licensing board discretion
over every detail of professional training and existence from schooling7 and
apprenticeship requirements 8 for licensure to the standards for opening
offices9 and the proper conduct of the profession by a licensee.
The legislature has conferred virtually unlimited discretion upon the
boards in the area of educational requirements. Many licensing statutes
require applicants for licensure to have been graduated from a school "approved" by the board. They do not, however, always specify clear-cut stand-

ards and qualifications for such approval.' The effect of the few statutes
which prescribe either minimum or maximum standards for the curriculum,
plant or teacher qualifications of the professional school" is diminished by
the absolute power of the board to determine the nature and level of the
examination for licensure.
97 (1961) ; Lansdowne Borough Bd. of Adjustment's Appeal, 313 Pa. 523, 170 Atl. 867
(1934) ; Easton Transit Co. Petition, 270 Pa. 136, 112 Atl. 917 (1921) ; State Bd. of
Funeral Directors v. Beaver County Funeral Directors Ass'n, 70 Dauphin 118, 10 Pa. D. &
C.2d 704 (C.P. 1957).
7. For example, the applicant for a funeral director's license must be a graduate
of an "approved" school. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 479.3(b) (1959). "Integration and
coordination of all educational requirements, including any academic work at a college
or university or actual class work in didactic and laboratory studies in a school of
embalming, shall be permitted and shall be encouraged under any rules or regulations
that the board shall make." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 479.3(d) (1959).
8. In the Funeral Director Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 479.3(f) (1959), the
following discretion is granted to the board: "The requirements, of a resident trainee, as
to maximum and minimum hours, the number of cases to be handled, and the training
and duties included and excluded, shall be fixed by rules and regulations of the board."
Pharmacist applicants must meet such internship requirements as the board prescribes.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 390-3(a) (4) (1959).
9. "[E]very place in which the profession of funeral directing is carried on shall
include a preparation room, constructed in accordance with sanitary standards prescribed
by the board, for the protection of public health." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 479.7 (1959).
10. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 402 (1959) provides:
It shall be the duty of the [medical] board, in its discretion, periodically to
ascertain the character of the instruction and the facilities possessed by each of
the various medical educational institutions and hospitals desiring interns, either
chartered under the laws of this Commonwealth or operating therein, for the
teaching of the various departments of medicine in accordance with the requirements of this act.
See also note 7 supra.
11. For example, to be a licensed barber school, the institution must require an eighth
grade education, have a licensed doctor attached to its staff, a "sufficient number of competent teachers . . . and equipment sufficient for the proper and full teaching of all subjects ...

." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 562(b)

(1959).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 67

The discretion granted to the boards to regulate the professional conduct
of a licensee is narrower than that involved in regulating the "potential"
licensee in the educational area. The distinction obviously is based on the
greater economic harm which denial of access would have on a person already
committed to a calling. 12 But, what is lost in scope is regained in depth of
confusion.
Most of the licensing statutes denominate behavior defined in terms of
"unethical" or "unprofessional practice" as a ground for the suspension or
revocation of a license. 13 Such a vague criterion for assessing conduct gives
great flexibility to agency decision but, concomitantly, affords the practitioner no predictability of its potential application. Such a result, however,
is not uncharacteristic of the broad delegations of legislative power which
have received judicial approval in most jurisdictions. Standards no less
vague than those in this field have run the separation-of-powers gauntlet on
the reasoning of our courts that "the legislative process would frequently
12. The difference in scope of board powers, between the two regulatory areas is
expressed on the federal level as a distinction between legislative and interpretive rulemaking powers. 1 DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958). There is no
disputing the fondness of the Pennsylvania courts for the maxim: "the legislature cannot
delegate a power to make a law but can make a law to delegate power." See Comment,
Delegation of Power to Administrative Agencies in Pennsylvania, 11 U. PITT. L. REV.
73 (1949). Yet, because there are no specific statutory standards regarding the educational requirements for unlicensed applicants, the rules of the licensing boards in this
area have the effect of law and for all intents and purposes are not reviewable by the
courts. In contrast, the existence of statutory standards for the conduct of licensees
means that the board rules in this area are merely interpretive of existing law and
valid only if the reviewing courts find the interpretation a permissible one.
13. Illustrations of the actual statutory descriptions of this disciplinary ground are:
"grossly unethical practice," Medical Practice Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 410 (1959) ;
"unethical conduct," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 271 (1959) (osteopaths) ; "fraudulent
or unlawful practices, . . . unprofessional conduct, detrimental or dangerous to the public
health, safety, morals or welfare, . . . wilful or gross malpractice or neglect," The
Dental Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 122(i) (1959) ; "unethical or dishonest practice
or conduct," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 559 (1959) (barbers). For other variant phraseology see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 9.9a(4) (Supp. 1961) (accountants), 26 (Supp.
1961) (architects), 42.16 (1959) (chiropodists), 151(i) (1959) (engineers), 224(8)
(1959) (nurses), 237 (1959) (optometrists), 390-5(a) (9) (Supp. 1961) (pharmacists),
479.11(5) (1959) (funeral directors), 506-3(g) (1959)
(veterinarians), 519 (1959)
(beauticians), 616(4) (1959) (chiropractors), and 666(1) (1959) (practical nurses).
Considering the common nature of most professional problems, reason dictates not
variety in basic licensing terminology, but rather, a uniform description that would at
least obviate the need for piecemeal litigation in the agency context to determine what
each term means. Two historical factors account for the present situation. One is the
staggered enactment of these licensing laws as each group became sufficiently well organized to demand official recognition. The other is the absence in the groups most recently
recognized of any established, self-disciplining system of ethics. This factor is illustrated
by a comparison of the Medical Practice Act and the more recently enacted Professional
Nursing Law. A physician must be guilty of "grossly unethical practice" to be suspended
from practice, but the nurse may be disciplined for only "unprofessional conduct, or . . .
such conduct as to require a suspension or revocation in the public interest." For a further
critique of the structure of licensing law penalties, see Note, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 403 (1956).
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bog down, if the Legislature were constitutionally required to appraise beforehand the myriad situations to which it wishes a particular policy to be applied
14
and to formulate rules for each situation.'
Two assumptions are implicit in such a rationale. The first is that a
legislature's delegation to administrative agencies of the power to formulate
regulatory rules is not a surrender of its power to make policy. Although
practical necessity may dictate its shifting the role of rule formulation to
administrative agencies, it retains the ultimate responsibility for policy making
through its power to check and weigh such rules in their actual application.
The second assumption is that in the particular area of regulation assigned
to an administrative agency, that body can be "better informed by experience"
than the legislature in solving the many problems which government must
handle. 15 It is this asserted expertness to which, in fact, the courts defer in
giving considerable weight to the factual findings of an administrative
16
agency.
At least in the licensing area, these assumptions are open to serious
question. There is no evidence that our Legislature has provided any direction
or supervision of licensing policy, 17 and it is disputable whether our licensing
boards are agencies composed of experts who are capable of reaching sound,
objective decisions.
Licensing board members are unsalaried and work only part time at
their duties,' rarely meeting more than three or four days a month. 19 More14. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) ; Water &Power

Resources Bd. v. Green Spring Co., 395 Pa. 1, 145 A.2d 178 (1958); Weinstein Liquor
License Case, 159 Pa. Super. 437, 441, 48 A.2d 1, 3 (1946): "It was not only impractical
but almost impossible for the legislature to anticipate all the various situations that
might arise in certain cases and provide therefor by specific standards or to classify
them."
15. See Fuchs, Fairness and Effectiveness in Administrative Agency Organization
and Procedures,36 IND. L.J. 1 (1960).
16. See note 3 supra.
17. The Legislature sought to correct this situation by adopting at its 1962 session
a resolution requiring each state administrative body to file its regulations with the Legislative Reference Bureau to be assembled there for presentation to its forthcoming session.
This regulation was described by the Speaker of the House as aimed at determining
whether and to what extent legislative authority had been "usurped" by administrative
agencies. This statement is misleading in two respects. First, it gives the impression
that administrative bodies have their duties set out for them under clear legislative
standards. The very opposite is true. The standards are either vague or non-existent,
requiring the agency to assume the legislative function of filling in the gaps. Secondly,
the statement is misleading because it overrates the present importance of agency regulations. It is in the area of unwritten, rather than written, policy that most administrative
action presently occurs. Consequently, the type of legislative supervision contemplated
by the resolution is too remote and indirect to be effective.
18. Board members are paid on a per diem basis. They were formerly paid $15
per day, but as of January 1, 1962, the per diem rate has been $30. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 773.3 (1962).
19. The frequency of meetings ranges from twice a year for the dental board to
four to five times a month for the cosmetology board.
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over, their staffs are small and relatively inexperienced. 2 Compounding the
problem of the inexperience of board members is the occasional enforced
absence of certain essential skills or knowledge. The Administrative Code
provision on the composition of the State Medical Board of Education and
Licensure, 2 ' for example, denies membership on the Board to any member of
a medical faculty, yet one of the principal duties of that agency is to establish
22
the standards of medical education in this state.
Presenting a more serious problem than inexpertness for objective decision making is the obvious conflict of interest of the members of licensing
boards. Membership on such boards is required by statute to be drawn, with
one or two exceptions, from the licensed profession itself.2 3 In some cases,
the Governor is under a statutory obligation to make board appointments
from a list of names submitted by the dominant professional association in
2 4

the field.

20. That many problems of the licensing boards are attributable to inadequate staffing cannot be denied. A board must rely on its staff to perform such functions as surveying the professional schools, assisting in the evaluation of licensure examinations,
checking the background and qualifications of applicants and investigating complaints
about the conduct of licensees. Unfortunately, staff size has been a function not of
these needs but of the amount of licensure fees collected from the particular profession.
This fact explains the apparent paradox of the medical board, with its important health
responsibilities, struggling along with four clerk typists, and the nursing board, with

its lesser medical responsibilities, possessing an executive secretary, several school
evaluators, and more clerical help than any other board. To correct this administrative
imbalance, various recommendations have been made to the Department of Public Instruction: see Letter of former Attorney General Thomas D. McBride, September 30,
1958; Memorandum of Deputy Attorney General Morris J. Dean, October 27, 1960;
Management Survey of Bureau of Professional Licensing of the Office of Administration,
October 1961; State Police Survey Requested by Attorney General David Stahl of
the Investigative Standards and Techniques of the Bureau of Professional Licensing,
July 20, 1962. The Department of Public Instruction has been engaged for some time
in a program to implement these recommendations.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 122 (1962). The only possible basis for the total
exclusion of the professional educator is the concern over the predilection of such persons to impose educational requirements that would have little or no relation to the
problems of actual professional practice. Although this may become a justifiable fear
if the emphasis on research continues to grow in certain medical teaching institutions,
it can hardly have been apposite until now, considering that most of the leading medical
teachers are also our foremost medical practitioners. A similar restriction on the membership of the pharmacy board was removed at the 1961 Session of the Legislature.
Pharmacy Act § 6, Pa. Laws 1961, act 669, § 6.
22. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 402 (1959), quoted in note 10 supra.
23. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 124 (dental board), 126 (osteopathic board),
and 128 (nursing board) (1962). There cannot be more than two barbers from the
same association on the barber board, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 172 (1962), nor more than
two from the same school on the chiropractic board, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 171
(1962). The State Board of Examiners of Certified Public Accountants must have two
lawyers in its membership and the five members must come from specified sections of
the state. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 131 (1962).
24. E.g., the State Board of Nurse Examiners. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 128
(1962).
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Because the services of board members are not salaried, most of them
remain active in their professional work. Consequently, frequent unofficial
contact between agency members and the interests they regulate, which is
generally condemned in other administrative fields, is a basic feature of the
licensing process. The nature of such membership may reflect the traditional
belief that professions are capable of regulating' themselves in the public
interest. In practice, however, a licensing board so constituted may tend to
be no more protective of the public interest than a trade guild.
Furthermore, the inherent orientation of members of a licensing board
to private professional interests rather than public goals is only one step
removed from their becoming identified with the private and often narrow
conflicting interests that develop within a profession. Indeed, the membership of licensing boards, while expressly designed to be drawn from the
regulated profession rather than the public, rarely presents a cross-section of
all the interests that exist within a profession. This seeming paradox is
explained by the tendency of the selective process to give representation on
the board only to the politically dominant element in a profession. For
example, the State Board of Pharmacy is composed entirely of members
who are proprietors of small, retail pharmacies; hence, there is no representation for the hospital, chain or discount establishment and the educational institutions which are all subject to the same licensing act.
Whatever the nature of the board's "representative" quality, however,
so long as it has a private-interest bias, it is likely to ignore the public considerations in any dispute which pits one private interest against another. The
result of such a process will be decisions that perforce will lack objectivity
but, nevertheless, may be legally valid because of the wide discretion conferred upon the agency. This point can be illustrated by examples of the
policies of two former boards which, only in recent years, have acquired a
public outlook.
The first involved the foreign medical graduate who applied for a license
to practice medicine in this state. Many such graduates were not required,
in their native lands, to take the pre-medical college courses which our
licensing law demands of students in American schools. However, the foreign graduate might have completed a more advanced course covering the
same subject in his medical school. In the case of English and the mandated
non-scientific courses, he might have acquired an adequate knowledge by
means other than formal education. Moreover, every foreign medical graduate
who applies to be examined for licensure in any state must have passed an
examination given in English on all medical subjects by a quasi-official
organization in this country known as the Educational Council for Foreign
Medical Graduates.
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In the face of such factors, the State Board of Medical Education and
Licensure was in a position to rule that the knowledge demonstrated by an
applicant in various subjects covered in professional schooling, post-graduate
training and the Council examination could be sufficient to offset any credit
deficiencies on the premedical educational level. Instead, it formerly chose
to give these factors only a limited effect-a bitter pill, indeed, for persons
no longer of student age or temperament that was not made more palatable
by the ludicrous turn taken by some of the "make-up" requirements. Thus,
former English physicians trained in English schools, because they had not
received six semester hours of English in college, 25 were compelled to take
a course in their native tongue. And, refugees who had fled from dictatorships in their native countries were required to take a course in political
science as credit against a deficiency in college biology on the theory that, as
new Americans, they should learn the history and values of democracy.
Obviously, this type of "literacy test" for foreign medical graduates was not
based on public health considerations. Indeed, to the extent that it was
successful in discouraging foreign doctors from entering this state and plying
their sorely needed skills, the public health might actually have been harmed. 26
A more elemental example of board bias in intraprofessional disputes
had been the attempt of the Barber Board to suspend the permit of any
barber shop without toilet facilities. What this additional "seat" contributed
to better barbering, at a cost to the public of those shops that could not afford
to install it, was apparent only to the then State Board of Barber Examiners
which pointed to its power to prevent barbering in "unsanitary places" as
27
sustaining its position.
It is evident that the decisions involved in these examples were not
objective in the sense of their being motivated primarily by the public interest
rather than private competitive considerations. Nevertheless, they probably
25. The requirement of six hours of college-level "English composition and literature" was clearly intended to limit qualifications for medical education to those with
sufficient linguistic ability to comprehend and to communicate the subject matter taught
in an English-speaking medical school. Consequently, contrary to the medical board's position, six hours of college instruction, not in English, but in one's native tongue, would be the
equivalent education for a foreign medical graduate. On the other hand, it would not be
unreasonable to require such an applicant to demonstrate to the board a working knowledge of the English language both in general and for purposes of medical practice. See
Medical Practice Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 403 (1959).
26. The test for a foreign preprofessional education deemed to be "equivalent"
was eased somewhat by Regulation 5.5 of the State Board of Medical Education and
Licensure, adopted August 10, 1961. The Board may presently accept "at its discretion" the successful passage of the examination given by the Educational Council for
Foreign Medical Graduates in lieu of a preprofessional deficiency of fifteen semester
hours. For an interpretation of this policy, see letter of Department of Justice re Dr.
Maranhao, February 1, 1962.
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 559(c) (Supp. 1961), 560 (1959).
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were legally valid decisions because of the wide discretion conferred by the
Legislature upon the decision-making boards. It should be equally plain, however, that when the discretion of these bodies was subsequently exercised with
less partiality in both cases, different "valid" conclusions were reached that
were more in the public interest.
This discussion makes clear the fact that the broad discretion of licensing
boards is particularly susceptible to abuse because of the tendency of these
agencies to lean in the direction of private interests. Obviously, such susceptibility provides a cogent reason for having fair licensing hearings available to all interested persons. This conclusion naturally raises the question
whether present safeguards in the licensing process would afford such a
hearing.
NATURE OF PRESENT SAFEGUARDS

To brace the licensing board structure against the tendency to lean in
the direction of private interests, only the safeguard of formal "adjudication
procedure" has been provided. 28 Such procedure may be invoked by persons
adversely affected by a board decision at a time when that decision becomes
final. 29 But this safeguard may be offset by other elements which come
into play earlier in the licensing process.
The informality and secrecy of most of the licensing proceedings are
aspects which appear capable of encouraging the tendency of the boards to
bear down harder in their regulation of applicants and licensees than is most
desirable from the standpoint of the public interest. Leading the way in the
other direction to which the board also instinctively inclines-letting up more
than is desirable-is the board's absolute power, in the first instance, to
refuse to prosecute persons who violate the licensing law or, after a proceeding has been instituted, to refuse to permit persons or groups opposed to the
interest of the licensee or applicant involved to intervene and be heard.
It seems apparent that bias and inexpertise would have a considerable
repressive impact in the informal proceedings of licensing agencies. 30 No
procedural safeguards need to be observed in such proceedings. Yet, at this
stage, unless the demands of a licensing board are acceded to by a licensee,
he would be forced to request a formal proceeding. This request would
pose an alternative threat: if the formal decision of the board is adverse, the
licensee loses his right to practice, save for the unlikely possibility of a
28.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.31-.46 (1962).

29. See note 5 supra.
30. "[E]ven where formal proceedings are fully available, informal procedures
constitute the vast bulk of administrative adjudication and are truly the lifeblood of the
administrative process."

REP'T Arr'y GEN. COMM. AD. PROC. 35 (1941),

1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 12, § 4.11.

quoted in
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reversal on appeal; on the other hand, even if the decision is not adverse, the
expense and publicity that may attend such a proceeding may involve greater
loss or risk of loss than peacefully yielding. 31
In order to avoid the unpleasant alternative of becoming involved in a
contest with a licensing board, a drug chain may terminate a highly successful advertising campaign offering trading stamps with prescriptions, a closely
held real estate corporation may reluctantly agree to make its principal officers
stockholders in the firm, or a nursing school may grudgingly accede to additional course and teacher qualification requirements. Informal procedures
thus allow a licensing board to "coerce" the consent of licensees. In the
same way, they give such boards the power to subject applicants for licensure
to arbitrary demands and pressures in proceedings which are in the nature
of "informal" adjudications. In such a proceeding, the agency is under no
obligation to specify the grounds for its decision. The decision itself is not
final in the legal sense and is not appealable. Informality of this type, by
promoting delay and confusion, weakens an applicant's ability to defend
himself. Such wearing tactics often result in the modification of his application to suit the board's wishes or in its complete withdrawal.
The usual incapacity of an individual licensee or applicant to resist
arbitrary pressures in the informal proceedings of licensing agencies is reinforced by the closed nature of such sessions. Although this practice is cast
in terms of protecting the professional reputation of the licensee against the
public's tendency to accept unproved charges, paradoxically, what may be
lost in the process is the intervention of those representatives of the public
that might protect the licensee against the board.
This is not to say that no public chink exists in the apparently impenetrable wall around informal licensing proceedings. The Superintendent of
Public Instruction is designated in the Administrative Code as a member of
every licensing board. As the only member of each board who is not drawn
from the particular profession regulated, and with a larger sense of public
responsibility derived from his other duties, the Superintendent, in theory,
is capable of providing an objective influence on the boards. Theory and fact
diverge, however, over the complete impracticability of dividing the Superintendent and his deputies3 2 among their principal duties in the education
area and the sixteen licensing agencies. The result is that the only "public"
member in the licensing process is practically precluded from exerting any
restraint on either the nature of or the manner in which decisions are reached
in informal licensing proceedings.
31. See 1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 12, § 4.06 (Coerced Consent).
32. The Superintendent may delegate a bureau head. William A. Beard, Inc. v.
State Bd. of Undertakers, 65 Dauphin 364 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
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Repressive regulation is but one side of the bias coin; the other is no
regulation at all by the licensing agencies. It is easy to see how bias may
produce this result in connection with complaints about the professional
conduct of licensees. Licensing board members may act with little zeal upon
complaints of members of the public in view of their tendency to identify themselves with their fellow practitioners. The form of board bias which favors
certain private interests within a profession may also result in the licensing of
unqualified persons. Of course, apathetic law enforcement on the part of
licensing boards means that unqualified persons may become licensed and
licensed persons who should be disqualified continue to practice.
Unfortunately, such an attitude is abetted by two features of the licensing
laws which actually protect a board's failure to act on complaints about licensee
conduct. The first is the absolute discretion of these agencies to refuse to
initiate an administrative hearing. The other is the unavailability of any
judicial alternative to the administrative proceeding to vindicate the interest
of the complaining party.
Except for the State Real Estate Commission, all of the licensing boards
have this discretion not to hear. The courts have held that "no matter how
easily provable a [complaint] may be and no matter how serious the wrong
to the complaining witness, the law affords no remedy for a capricious refusal
to institute proceedings. 3'1 3 State Real Estate Commission jurisdiction,
however, is more of the mandatory than the discretionary type. "Any
person" may file a complaint against a broker and the Commission "shall
promptly investigate" the actions complained of.A4 Although the Commission's decision to dismiss such a complaint is deemed final under the
licensing statute, notice thereof must be given to the complaining party and
35
it must be recorded in the public docket of the Commission.
Not only do the licensing laws give the board the power to refuse to
institute disciplinary proceedings against a licensee for improper conduct,
but, except for the Funeral Director Law, they complete this pattern by denying the complainant the power .to pursue any other remedy for such conduct. As our courts have repeatedly stated, a professional licensing law
represents a "scheme of regulation" which is designed to give the licensing
board "exclusive authority" over charges against licensed persons.30 Thus, as
33. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 10 (1930) ; Jaffe, The Individual Right
To Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IOWA L. REV. 485, 502 (1940).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 440(a) (1959).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 440(d) (1959).
36. The cases in which this conclusion was reached involved the question whether
private persons or associations had the authority to institute injunctive proceedings
against licensees to enforce the requirements of the licensing laws. Boggs v. Werner, 372
Pa. 312, 94 A.2d 50 (1953) ; Felix v. Wax, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 600 (C.P. 1958) ; Snyder
v. Oestreich, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 92 (C.P. 1956) ; see also, Stiles v. Stiles, 397 Pa. 352, 155
A.2d 367 (1959).
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a whole, the licensing process does not recognize a complainant's right to
compel a hearing on licensee conduct either before a board or the courts.
This is an administrative pattern which has been justified in other areas as
necessary to develop an integrated policy that can adapt itself to changing
experience and needs. 37 But, it is also a pattern which involves an unlimited
power to refuse to act-no mean danger, as indicated, in the licensing field.
The Funeral Director Law8 s provides the one exception that proves the
rule of exclusive agency authority. In the case of Stiles v. Stiles, 9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that, quite apart from the authority of the State
Board of Funeral Directors, the Funeral Director Law authorizes any court
of equity, at the instance of any interested party, to enjoin illegal operations
by licensees.

40

A logical extension of denying a complainant the right to invoke the
jurisdiction of a licensing board against a licensee is the non-recognition of
any right on his part to intervene or appeal, should any disciplinary proceeding
be instituted. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that, with the exception of
the Funeral Director Law, 41 no licensing law gives the complaining party
the right to be heard on the improper conduct of a licensee.
Admittedly, the licensing process does not have the same statutory
clarity about the absence of the right of such a party to appeal from a board
decision in favor of a licensee. The difficulty centers on a determination
37. See Jaffe, supra note 33, at 530.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 479.1-.20 (1959).
39. Supra note 36.
40. Such jurisdiction was found in the language in § 12 of the Funeral Director
Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 479.12 (1959), that "any association of funeral directors
or any person having an interest may, by an action in equity, obtain an injunction to
prevent the illegal operation of a person, firm, corporation or establishment in violation
of law or the regulations of the board." (Emphasis added.) In deciding that the term
"person" in this section embraces licensed as well as unlicensed individuals, the court
placed parties "interested" in the conduct of a licensee in the anomalous position of having
standing to attack such conduct in a court of equity, but, by not being an "aggrieved"
party, lacking standing to appeal from a Board decision refusing to discipline the same
licensee for such conduct.
The equity jurisdiction found by Stiles is incompatible with the judicial objectives of
predictability and uniformity in statutory application. Not only is jurisdiction over
licensee conduct held by the Board of Funeral Directors, but the law also confers equity
jurisdiction in such cases on "the court of common pleas of the county where the violations occur or where the defendant may be served." Consequently, disparity in the application of this regulatory statute is threatened, not only by the prospect
between the Board and an interested party to institute administrative action
junctive proceeding in the different forums available to them, but also by
possible sources of decision. This latter threat is aggravated by the statute's

of a race
or an inthe many
failure to

confer upon the Board standing to appeal from decisions reached in the equitable actions
brought in the courts. What this analysis suggests is that the administrative process
should be checked, not by creating a second duplicate system of judgment, but by adding

safeguards from within.
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 479.12 (1959).
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whether a complaining member of the public is encompassed by the notion
of an "aggrieved party," under the Administrative Agency Law provision
granting such person the standing to secure judicial review of an agency
decision. 42 Although there is no- case law directly on this issue, two principles
have evolved in the court decisions that foreshadow an answer. The case of
4
State Bd. of Undertakers v. Joseph T. Sekula Funeral Homes, Inc.,

first enunciated the principle that the privilege of intervening or being heard
does not, of itself, create a sufficient interest to prosecute an appeal. Consequently, if a complainant is to be an "aggrieved" party, it cannot be as a
result simply of becoming a "prosecuting witness."
The second principle enunciated in case law is that no one has standing
to prosecute an appeal challenging the decision of a board to license an
individual. 44 Clearly, this rejected form of standing is not analogous to
the standing of members of the public affected by and challenging the
propriety of licensee conduct. Consequently,' even if a person attacking board
licensing action is not an aggrieved party, it does not follow that a party
complaining of licensee conduct may not be.
Combining both principles, it is evident that the question of the standing
of a complainant has not been judicially settled. Although his status as a
prosecuting witness will not qualify him as an aggrieved party, neither is
he sufficiently similar to a person attacking board licensing action to be
disqualified. Despite the inconclusive nature of the judicial authority on
this point, however, it would be difficult for a court to conclude that
the same person who, in the first instance, had no right to compel a board
hearing or to intervene to enlighten the board as to the facts, should, nevertheless, after the hearing is concluded, have the right to challenge the board's
decision. In short, it is impossible to deny the licensing law pattern of the total
non-recognition of the rights of complaining parties.
Granted that a board's refusal to act on a particular complaint about
licensee conduct is judicially unassailable, does not affirmative licensing
42. "[A]ny person aggrieved thereby who has a direct interest in such adjudication
shall have the right to appeal therefrom." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.41 (1962). The
scope of the term "aggrieved party" has been limited by a number of decisions to include
only a person who has a direct and immediate, substantial and pecuniary interest in the
question under litigation. Giammaria Liquor License Case, 166 Pa. Super. 263, 70 A.2d
402 (1950) ; Seitz Liquor License Case, 157 Pa. Super. 553, 43 A.2d 547 (1945). This
concept, by definition, is hostile to representative groups and persons. Pennsylvania
Commercial Drivers Conference v. Pennsylvania Milk Control Comm'n, 360 Pa. 477,
62 A.2d 9 (1948) ; State Bd. of Funeral Directors v. Beaver County Funeral Director's
Ass'n, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 704 (C.P. 1957); Pennsylvania Chiropractor's Ass'n v. State
Bd. of Medical Education & Licensure, 41 Pa. D. & C. 519 (C.P. 1941).
43. 339 Pa. 309, 14 A.2d 308 (1940) ; see also Arsenal Bd. of Trade v. Pennsylvania
PUC, 166 Pa. Super. 548, 72 A.2d 612 (1950).
44. Authorities cited note 6 supra.
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action on its part which is challenged as improper present a more important
issue warranting a different result? Although the answer seems self-evident,
another basic aspect of the licensing process would appear to be that board
action is as invulnerable to legal challenge as its inaction.
In Keystone Racing Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm'n,45 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an applicant for one of only four
potential licenses for harness racing tracks that were required to be geographically distributed throughout the state lacked sufficient interest to
challenge the grant of one of the licenses to a different applicant in his own
vicinity. In light of that decision, a member of a profession would hardly have
the standing to obtain judicial review of the grant of an additional professional
license. Yet, unless the professional licensee is regarded as having a sufficient
private interest to obtain that type of review, no one else is likely to qualify
for this protective role. For, apart from the restrictive standing doctrine
embodied in our Administrative Agency Law, our courts have also circumscribed the use of the form of action that is aimed at vindicating interests
of a public rather than private nature. In other jurisdictions, the mandamus
action and taxpayer suit for injunction have been broadened to the point
where a plaintiff, even if lacking interest in his own right, can secure relief
as a citizen.46 In contrast, mandamus may not be used in this state to review
the type of discretionary act involved in granting a professional license. 47
Nor, may a suit be used by a person in his taxpayer capacity to test the
action of any licensing board, however illegal, since it could not have an
adverse effect on the treasury.4 8 Thus, it is evident that there is no present
effective judicial control over either a licensing board's refusal to act on a
complaint of unprofessional conduct or its improper action in granting professional licensure.
This discussion has indicated that few of the decisive determinations in
the licensing process-the molding of policy, the interpretation and creation
of law, the application of old policy or law to new problems-are made on
the basis of what is produced at a formal hearing invoked under the Administrative Agency Law. Rather, they are formulated much earlier in the
45. Supra note 6.
46. A consumer was characterized as a "private Attorney General" and permitted
to protest the pricing order of a federal agency in Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
47. See Reader, Judicial Review of "Final" Administrative Decisions in Pennsylvania, pp. 8-22 supra.
48. Page v. King, 285 Pa. 153, 131 Atl. 707 (1926). Moreover, statutory restrictions
on appeal may not be circumvented by resort to equity action. Glen Alden Coal Co. v.
State Tax Equalization Bd., 367 Pa. 63, 79 A.2d 645 (1951). For a comprehensive discussion of the problem of standing, see Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public
Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265 (1961) ; Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private
Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255 (1961).
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process with virtually no safeguards or judicial review. There is, indeed, considerable support for the position that the present adjudicative formalities are
nothing but the statutory addition of an otherwise "unnecessary nail in the
coffin." '49 Under such circumstances, an interested party clearly does not
have an adequate opportunity to persuade a licensing board in its decision
making. Moreover, in the uncontested situation-i.e., where the board and
the licensee or applicant agree-the Administrative Agency Law, by failing
to allow the intervention of an interested third party, totally denies that
opportunity to persons who might affect licensing decisions.
In light of this discussion, it is clear that the present safeguards come
too late to assure interested parties an opportunity to persuade the decision
makers. Without such opportunity, there can be no fair hearing either for
licensees, applicants or the public. The crucial question is whether the
licensing process is capable of being changed to afford the type of hearing that
can produce reasoned and objective decisions.
REMEDIAL PROPOSALS

A decision of an agency cannot be objective unless it is reached after an
impartial evaluation of all the essential facts. There may be no apparent relationship between a board's access to the facts and its attitude in the face of
such facts. The suggestions for improving these aspects of decision making,
however, are based on the assumption that the predispositions of board members will often yield to the persuasive pressure of countervailing facts that
are timely produced.
The problem of the partiality of licensing boards, while arising initially
from their guild-like composition, draws its strength from the in camera
nature of their proceedings. Completely absent is the deterrent factor of
any outside review of their actions. One way of providing such review, short
of a change in legislative attitude towards some such supervision, would be to
open all of the proceedings of the boards to the public. But, apart from the
question of its legality, 49a complete public review, by threatening to focus
attention on publicity-shy licensees, would heighten rather than minimize
the danger of a licensee's refusing to challenge arbitrary administrative
action.
49. "The prehearing conferences are so intense that the ultimate decision after
formal hearing can be little more than a formal gesture superimposed upon what everyone, including the respondent, concedes is a fait accompli. After the elaborate pre-

liminaries, the hearings are nothing but the statutory addition of an otherwise unnecessary
nail in the coffin."
TEM 31 (1940).

ATT'Y GEN. COMM. AD. PROC. MONOGRAPH, FEDERAL RESERVE SYS-

49a. See Memorandum of Deputy Attorney General Morris J. Dean to the Department of Public Instruction, February 1, 1962, concerning the application of the "rightto-know law," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.2 (1959), to various types of information in
the files of the professional licensing boards.
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No such objection, however, could be raised to the present system's
concept of having the Superintendent of Public Instruction serve as an
official member of every board. Such system is capable of providing the type
of review of official action which would deter board members at no risk
to the reputation of the affected licensee. Although it is not the type of review
aimed at assessing the merits of a particular decision, it can lay bare the
grounds for any decision, without reference to the identity of the particular
parties involved. Obviously, such action would provide members of the
profession and other interested parties with an opportunity to examine and
critically evaluate the standards involved in licensing decisions. The result
of such wide-scale evaluation would inevitably be the development of effective
opposition to arbitrary licensing action.
It is now officially recognized that the proper operation of the present
system requires the appointment of a permanent deputy superintendent on
all of the licensing boards. Such an arrangement is necessary for two reasons.
First, if the individual is to qualify for his role as a prober of the bases of
the actions of licensing agencies, he must have sufficient time and opportunity
to study the broad range of his subject. Second, if such person is not to be
raised above his professional co-members to the level of a "first among
equals,'" he should not be assigned any administrative or fiscal powers or
responsibilities in the professional licensing field. In addition, this deputy
should not be a member of any of the licensed professions. Lay status is
better suited to his function of probing and exposing the bases of the decisions
of his professional colleagues because such person, having no professional
knowledge, must ask questions and, having no preconceived professional
notions, he will ask questions that will take nothing for granted.
The significance of the presence of a public member demanding explanations for the record extends not only to what a board does but also to
what it fails to do. The need to justify its refusal to act is likely to counteract
a board's partiality against proceeding in certain types of cases. The result
will be to bring the operation of the licensing boards closer to the principle
that an administrative agency has the duty to proceed affirmatively in enforcing its governing statute rather than to depend, as do the courts, upon
the ability, energy and will of complainants to bring a properly developed case
5°
before it.
50. See note 15 supra. A more radical proposal for improved supervision, seriously
entertained thus far only by the author, envisages a series of reorganization plans which
would, with the exceptions noted, transfer the licensing boards from the jurisdiction of
the Department of Public Instruction and place them, in each case, under the roof of that
department having most in common with the particular profession involved. To the
Department of Health would be transferred (1) the Pharmacy Board, to be serviced
by expanding the present administrative arm of the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Board;

PROFESSIONAL LICENSING PROCESS

1962]

Yet, granting that an active public member of the board will improve its
attitude towards the facts in given cases, there remains the other basic problem-how, in the first instance, are the essential facts in such cases to be
brought to the board's attention.
Basic to the problem of a board's access to the facts is the board-licensee
two-party pattern. The product of the combination of statutory and judicial
restrictions on intervention and appeal by other "interested" persons, such
a two-party judicial mold was devised for individual rather than group
interests. 5' Consequently, this pattern creates the impossible task of sorting
out and assigning all the group interests involved in a given dispute to
either the board or the licensee for adequate representation.
One obvious suggestion for meeting this problem would have the
legislature extend the pattern of the Funeral Director Law to the other
licensed professions by providing rights of intervention in a given case to all
"interested" parties and professional associations. Another suggestion for
providing representation for those group demands that defy two party
classification involves creating a public counsel. 52 This view holds that the
effectiveness of such counsel is capable of being measured by his "capacity to
irritate the agency members," 53 on the premise that the greater his emphasis
on those interests which such members usually prefer to ignore, the greater
their irritation.
The difficulty with this "gadfly" role for a counsel is that it is likely
to improve the licensing process only if it produces board member irritation
for the right reasons. In most licensing situations, there are so many group
(2) the Medical, Osteopathic, Dental, Chiropody, Chiropractic, Optometric and Nursing
Boards to the placed within a new healing arts bureau; (3) and the Funeral Directors
Board, to be juxtaposed administratively with the Bureau of Vital Statistics and the
Anatomical Board. To the Department of Agriculture would be transferred the Veterinary
Board; to the Department of Labor and Industry, the Architect and Engineering Boards,
to be serviced by expanding the present Bureau of Inspection; and to the Department of
Banking, the State Real Estate Commission and the Certified Public Accountants Board,
both to be administratively allied with the Securities Commission. Within the Department
of Public Instruction, the Barber and Cosmetology Boards would be transferred to the
present Bureau of Vocational Schools.
51. See Cowan, Group Interests, 44 VA. L. REv. 331, 333 (1958).
52. See Carrow, Dean Landis and the Regulatory Process, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
718 (1961). Dean Landis' Report on the Regulatory Agencies was published as SUBCOMMITTEE ON

ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D. SESs., REPORT ON THE REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960).

For other suggestions concerning an institution similar to a public counsel, see Hear-

ings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess., at 6 (1960); HOOVER COMMISSION
TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 36 (1949) ; FINAL REPORT, ATT'Y
GEN. COMM. AD. PROC. 123 (1941).

53.

Carrow, supra note 52.
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interests involved that conflicts between some of them are inevitable. Cast,
in each case, in the role of an advocate of only those interests which will
produce the greatest good for the greatest number, a public counsel would
constantly need to decide which of the conflicting interests to support or to
slight. Under such circumstances, it would often be open to question whether
the counsel, in his choice of an interest with which to prick the conscience
of the board, had properly applied the "public" standard.
Granted, this is the dilemma of any counsel who purports to represent
a conglomerate interest like the public or the consumer, yet, in the licensing
process, because such counsel would presently occupy the only "third" party
position, it represents an especially vulnerable variation on the old problem
of "who investigates the investigator." It is apparent, therefore, that the
creation of a public counsel should only be considered in conjunction with
extending rights of intervention to other third parties.
In any event, neither of these proposed changes could be effected without legislative approval. In contrast, the State Board of Pharmacy approach
to the hospital formulary system 54 suggests an available administrative
answer to the problem of giving all interested parties an opportunity to be
heard. The Board's interest in hospital formularies originated with a
complaint by a major drug manufacturer that a certain hospital pharmacist
had acted without the consent of the prescribing physician in dispensing a
drug product other than the manufacturer's brand-name article, which had
been prescribed. Since such consent is required by the Pharmacy Act,5 "
upon pain of license suspension or revocation, a citation was issued against
the pharmacist in this case for the illegal substitution of drugs. The pharmacist licensee argued that the prescribing physician had authorized this
type of substitution when he contractually consented to the hospital formulary
system on assuming a staff position with the hospital.
There was much to be said in favor of the formulary system. 6 But,
in compelling the hospital pharmacist to present these points to the Board
54. A formulary system is a compilation which arranges those drug products under
one chemical or generic name which, despite possible differences in brand name, possess
a similar chemical composition. Those under one generic name are deemed "generic
equivalents." As the formulary system was practiced in Pennsylvania before this case,
the physician would identify the prescribed drug by brand name, but the pharmacist was
permitted to dispense any generic equivalent listed by the hospital formulary. Moreover,
because a physician's designation was not deemed an expression of desire for the particular
product, when a physician actually wanted a particular brand he had to submit a special
order for review and approval by a formulary committee.
55. The then operating law can be found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 318(3) (1959).
Similar language is in the new act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 390-5 (a) (8) (Supp. 1961).
56. It was designed to effect a reduction in the number of drug items required to
be stocked in a hospital pharmacy, not only to reduce the overall size and cost of the
inventory, but also, by concentrating on fewer items, to make possible the maximum
economies of quantity purchasing.
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in order to protect his right to practice, adjudicative procedure squarely raised
the issue whether that person was properly cast in the role of sole defender
of the formulary system in place of those most vitally interested in its con57
tinuance-e.g., hospital administrators and generic drug manufacturers.
For, obviously, much could also be said against the formulary system as it
58
was then being practiced in this state.
Following the hearing in this case, the Board suspended the license of
the hospital pharmacist for illegal substitution; however, the decision did
not rest on the validity of the formulary system, leaving unanswered broader
public health questions. Fortunately for the public, the Board was concerned
about the larger implications of this case. After obtaining the agreement of
licensee's counsel to postpone his argument of the appeal taken from the
Board decision, it took the unusual step of convening a conference on the
very questions which had been under litigation. Such action in this case
represented an abandonment of the formal two-party litigation approach, in
which the issues had necessarily been limited, in favor of an informal freewheeling conference to which were invited the groups most vitally interested
in the subject of hospital formulary. These included the administrators of
hospitals, both publicly and privately owned, hospital pharmacists, retail
pharmacists and drug manufacturers.
Thus, when the Board promulgated standards of conduct in this area,
in the form of regulations, their evident intent to prevent possible formulary abuses was balanced by a concern for adapting the new safeguards
to existing hospital operating procedures. So successfully were public ends
combined with fair means that no hospital found it politic to oppose these
regulations, despite the significant restrictions which they imposed on the
freedom of hospital pharmacy action. 59
57.

Except for the complaining brand-name manufacturer in this case, no other

affected group interest could intervene in this proceeding to present these views to the
Board. For discussion of this problem in a slightly different context, see notes 41-44
supra and accompanying text.
58. These arguments may be summarized as follows: the best evidence of what
a physician wants for a particular patient is the prescription he writes, not the blanket
authorization to dispense "generic equivalents" found in the physician's contract of
employment; drugs may be chemically equivalent but not therapeutically equivalent;
the hospital policy of limiting a formulary program to its ward patients seems less consistent with the theory that generic equivalents are completely interchangeable than with
a decision to provide a lower level of drug therapy based purely on cost considerations;
and because a hospital purchasing program under a formulary system is aimed at acquiring
claimed chemical equivalence rather than specific brands, there is a danger of the widespread purchase of off-brand merchandise without a real knowledge of the integrity and
reputation of the manufacturer.
59. As for the original proceeding against the hospital pharmacist, his suspension
was remitted when the hospital with which he was associated accepted the new regulations.
It is interesting to note that a change in the composition of the Pharmacy Board
since the hospital regulations has also brought a complete reversal in its attitude towards
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The lesson of this example is clear for any licensing dispute which is
many-sided, in the sense that the standards of conduct at issue involve interests that cannot be adequately represented by the defendant. In such disputes,
the deputy superintendent can do much to impress the board members with
the contrast between the narrow view of a subject that inheres in the method
of "adjudicating" the issues and the more enlightened outlook that can come
from deciding issues by a regulatory approach of this type.
This difference in outlook produced by the two procedures is the result
of their viewing legal standards from opposing perspectives. Rule making
examines statutory requirements from the standpoint of defining the future
duties and standards of conduct of many unspecified persons in the abstract. 6°
Hence, it is concerned with foreseeing the various situations and all the
issues that are likely to be disputed in a given problem area. Adjudicatory
procedure reviews a statutory standard to determine the duties of a named
licensee in an existing dispute. Hence, it is aimed at singling out and examining only those issues that are actually in dispute at the time.
This basic difference in the scope of inquiry of these two regulatory
techniques accounts for their important procedural differences. Rule-making
procedure achieves its purpose of encouraging the participation of many
parties in rule formulation through such informal means as written comments
upon tentative rules, consultations and conferences. 06 On the other hand, the
adjudicative procedure was designed to achieve its objective of narrowing
the issues and otherwise protecting the licensee against irrelevant and improper
charges, by means of formalities and restrictions on the number of parties.
Unfortunately, as we have observed, the licensing process has, at times,
turned these aspects against objective licensing decisions. It is evident,
public hearings. The present Board recently added to its deserved reputation for both
arbitrary action and repressive tactics by adopting far-reaching industry wide regulations
without (1) adequate consultation with representatives from pharmacy circles, (2)
providing any opportunity for review and comment by extra-professional bodies or

interests, (3) making available copies of the regulations for interested and affected
persons, or (4) requesting or obtaining the approval of the Department of Justice as
to the legality of the regulations. Even a strong Deputy Superintendent would be hard
pressed to protect the public against a board of this type. This action of the Board points
to the wisdom of the original bill form of the present Administrative Agency Law which,
at the time of its introduction in the Legislature, contained a provision requiring a public
hearing. See Hanna, Lights and Shadows in State Administrative Procedure Under the
Pennsylvania Administrative Agency Law, 24 TEMP. L.Q. 261 (1951).
60. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. REV. 259, 265
(1938), defines rule making as "the issuance of regulations or the making of determinations which are addressed to indicated but unnamed and unspecified persons or situations."
See also DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE LAW 21
(1927).
61. See I DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 12, §§ 6.01 (Procedures for Rule Making; No

Participation of Parties), 6.02 (Written Presentations, Consultations, and Conferences),
and 6.03 (Advisory Committees).
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however, that the nature and purpose of rule making are opposed to the
use of any of these adjudicative aspects. Consequently, if the licensing boards
can be persuaded by their deputy superintendent to adopt a rule-making
procedure as part of their internal administration, 2 such action should solve
the problem of giving consideration in a licensing decision to the views of all
affected persons.
It is arguable, of course, that, this is not a complete answer. There is
no disputing the fact that certain problems do not lend themselves to "capture
within the boundaries of a general rule" but must be dealt with on a caseby-case basis.0 3 But, the best reason for keeping this exclusive area for
adjudication as limited as possible was provided, ironically enough,
by a recent argument on behalf of giving it a wider scope.
Under discussion at a rule-making conference were certain proposed
regulations of the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure governing
the practice of medicine by those associations of physicians which sought to
qualify as corporations for federal income tax purposes.8 4 The spokesman for
many of the medical groups in attendance rose to challenge the proposals
on two grounds. First, several of the regulations were deemed unsatisfactory
because the standards they prescribed for an acceptable medical association
were inflexible. If standards were necessary at all, he argued, they should
be sufficiently vague to allow the profession to "wait and see" what types of
associations would actually develop and only then would the Board need to
determine their adherence to ethical standards.
The spokesman then indicated his opposition to the proposal that the
name of the medical association should comprise the last names of its member
physicians and not consist of any descriptive or other fictitious titles. Pointing
to the existence of many medical groups with such fictitious names, he
decried their proposed prohibition on the ground that these established
organizations had relied on the failure of the Board to express its views
earlier on this subject.
His two arguments were plainly antithetical: on the one hand, he had
asked the Board not to judge a situation until it came into existence and, on
the other, he had admonished the Board against challenging a situation once
62.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 71, § 186 (1962) authorizes departmental boards and commis-

sions to prescribe regulations "for the government of their respective ...

boards ... and

performance of their business ......
63. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
64. The nature of the notice of the opportunity to be heard on these proposed regulations consisted of distributing copies of the proposals approximately forty-five days

prior to the scheduled hearing date to such groups, persons, or publications as the Penn-

sylvania Medical Society, American Medical Association, The Tax Committee of the
Pennsylvania Bar Association, Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Prentice-Hall, Inc., and
various well known tax practitioners throughout the state.
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it had permitted it to come into existence. Nevertheless, after weighing these
contradictory arguments, the conclusion is inescapable in the licensing field
that it is far better to try to anticipate improper situations than it is to try to
undo arrangements after they are established.
Rule making fulfills this need of licensing agencies to take hold of basic
problems before they reach the stage of crisis or dispute. 65 Not only is this
procedure designed to develop policy in advance but, by allowing all interested parties an opportunity to be heard, it will invariably produce a wiser
and fairer policy.
CONCLUSION

It is evident that many persons who are affected by licensing decisions
are denied an effective opportunity to persuade licensing boards in their
consideration of the issues. The public has an important stake in correcting
this state of affairs because of the tendency of these agencies to lean in the
direction of private interests. A combination of remedial measures should
be considered. Legislative action should be taken to amend the licensing
laws in the following respects: (1) boards should be required to hold
hearings on complaints about licensee conduct and (2) professional associations and a "consumer" counsel should be permitted to be heard by the
boards and the courts on any licensing decision. Executive action should be
taken (1) to speed up the implementation of programs for larger and improved licensing staffs and for the assignment of one Deputy Superintendent
to all licensing boards, and (2) to shift the emphasis of the boards from
adjudicative proceedings to the promulgation of rules and regulations after
public hearing.
65. Although this article has emphasized regulatory procedure as a means of giving
the professional boards a broader and fuller view of facts and issues in the exercise of
their decisional functions, there are other significant ways in which administration by
regulation serves the purpose of obtaining fair, objective decisions. For a consideration
of the regulatory process from this broader standpoint, see Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV.
863 (1962).

